By Peter D. Feaver
How do civilians keep watch over the army? within the wake of September eleven, the renewed presence of nationwide defense in lifestyle has made this query all of the extra urgent. during this booklet, Peter Feaver proposes an formidable new concept that treats civil-military kin as a principal-agent dating, with the civilian government tracking the activities of army brokers, the ''armed servants'' of the countryside. army obedience isn't really computerized yet is dependent upon strategic calculations of no matter if civilians will seize and punish misbehavior.
This version demanding situations Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based version of civil-military kinfolk, and gives an leading edge approach of constructing experience of the U.S. chilly struggle and post-Cold battle experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military kinfolk of the Clinton period. within the decade after the chilly battle ended, civilians and the army had various run-ins over even if and the way to take advantage of army strength. those episodes, as interpreted through business enterprise thought, contradict the normal knowledge that civil-military kin topic provided that there's hazard of a coup. to the contrary, army professionalism doesn't on its own confirm unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, organization concept deals the easiest origin for wondering family members among army and civilian leaders, now and sooner or later.
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Extra resources for Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
S. national security (Russett 1990, pp. 87–118). More to the point, viewed in context with the other polling information about public respect for the military, cited above, attitudes about the need for increases or decreases in the defense budget are not reliable indicators of an underlying liberal hostility toward the military. 10 Huntington’s real concern was whether a liberal society would support enough defense spending to prevail in the Cold War. Clearly, in retrospect, it did. Huntington’s Cold War Puzzle 27 Evidence that American society supported enough military spending, however, is not evidence that Huntington’s prescriptions were followed.
100). Furthermore, while the questions were not asked often enough to establish a ﬁrm trend, it is suggestive that the few times mass public opinion surveys asked about military inﬂuence or military culpability for failures, the responses were strongly supportive of the military against civilian leaders. ” And perhaps most interestingly, in a 1967 Harris poll the public clearly ﬁxed blame for the lack of progress in the Vietnam War on Secretary of Defense McNamara, not General Westmoreland; the preference for Westmoreland over McNamara held true across all viewpoints on what to do in Vietnam, whether to pursue “total military victory,” “ﬁght to get negotiated peace,” or “get out as quickly as possible” (Clotfelter 1969, pp.
This was at odds, moreover, with his 1957 observation that fusionism was waning in the American civil-military system (Huntington 1957, p. 459). Huntington’s Cold War Puzzle 37 Huntington’s 1977 treatment of the overlap of functions did, however, match Janowitz’s arguments about civil-military convergence. Janowitz saw the convergence most of all in the civilianization of the military, in which the functional specialty of the military, the management of violence, lost its distinctiveness and the military increasingly adopted organizational and managerial tools from the civilian world of business and commerce.